Quail

A state-attributed cyber-attack on CNI is very possible (e.g. Russian cyber attack on Danish water utilities). 

AI use is a barrier. So far there has been a single attributed case.

Attribution is also a barrier, as it takes time. The Danish example took place in 2024, but was not (at least publicly) attributed until December 2025. A more major attack would probably be more likely to be attributed quickly.

It is not entirely clear in the resolution criteria whether the attack and the attribution both need to occur between 19 Dec 2025 and 01 July 2026, or whether 1) a historical attack that is newly attributed, or 2) an attack before 01 July 2026 that is not attributed until 2027 would count. I assume it is the attribution that needs to occur before 01 July 2026, regardless of when the attack took place.

This feels like a fairly low probability due to how rare attributions to states seem to be, compared to the relatively short timeframe and the lack of widespread use of AI in cyber-attacks.

Elections and the surrounding politics often seem highly uncertain. Everyone wants to be on the winning side (incentive to bridge divides and form blocs), but also have deep-seated grievances and differences of opinion (barrier to alliances). 

Hezbollah seems to be in a weaker position than it was in 2022 (when it also failed to win a majority), following events in Syria and the conflict with Israel. I am not sure how the Lebanese people see these events - they could inflame anti-Israeli sentiment, or they could persuade people that Hezbollah's strategy is a futile and ineffective waste of resources. I think the latter is more likely. 

There also seems to be some division around electoral laws and how the diaspora vote should be counted, which could swing some half-dozen seats one way or the other. This adds to the unpredictability of the outcome - this different interpretation might have been enough to swing the 2022 election in Hezbollah's favour.

I'm going to crudely assume a 45% likelihood (given the 2022 result and election law uncertainty), but then suppress this to 30% due to geopolitical events showing the weakness of Hezbollah and its Iranian/Syrian allies. 

JNIM doesn't appear to have the military strength to take Bamako by force - it's strategy seems to revolve around avoiding direct confrontation and focus on weakening the junta's forces through causing economic disruption.

So really this comes down to the resolve of the junta (seems solid - everything to lose, nothing to gain), and how able they are to maintain order (I've not seen any evidence of protests so far - just queues). 

The pressure on the junta seems manageable at the moment, and they retain military control.