ishmael

Can't say I've read everything but it seems like Egypt's economy has stabilized. I think the international community also has a stake in keeping Egypt stable lest it destabilize the fragile Gaza ceasefire

Much has been made of Trump's role in a ceasefire (especially by himself), but these countries have plenty of incentive to keep the peace regardless, including their interdependent economies. They made a truce, and then signed a peace accord, and have more or less stuck to it since then. I am confident that the leaders of these 2 countries will try to avoid further conflict.

I see events noted in others' forecasts that I'm not seeing on the internets, so info is spotty, but it looks to me like there's only been one (civilian) death since the peace accord Oct. 26. Mines are a concern but, as big as the high-profile incidents have shown, they often result in injury rather than death.

Since Q3=8,167 mcm, Q4 would need to be at least 10,833 mcm, which would be a 33% increase from Q3. Since 2021, Q4 has been roughly similar to Q3, so a 33% increase this year would be extremely unusual. I'd give this a 1% chance by base rate alone.

Add on top of that the EU's preference to not buy Russian gas, such as potential implementation of the REPowerEU plan, and the likelihood drops to <0.5%.

My low expectations are mostly based on the extremely tight time frame of the next 3.5 months; all 19 countries may get there eventually.

The US is definitely not doing so in the next 3.5 months. The new PM of Japan is nominating Trump for the Nobel peace prize, and the PM of Italy is also a bit Trumpy. I'm not sure why Germany hasn't recognized Palestine but since they didn't join the wave of neighbors to do so last year, when there was pressure to do something during the awful fighting in Gaza, they're unlikely to do so now. S. Korea feels more likely to me, but as with Germany there is no pressure to recognize Palestine now, while risking upsetting relations with the US.

Since there are currently only 14 countries on the list, the question allows for TWO of the 5 countries, each of which already unlikely, to recognize Palestine yet still be "16 or fewer."

The internets aren't always consistent depending on how you research, so it's hard to nail down a base rate with any confidence - but it's looking to me like roughly 2 such deals per year in the past 2-3 years. Responding now in mid-November, there are 8.5 months left for resolution. So, going by a (questionable) base rate of 2/year, it should be likely that one occurs over 8.5 months.

The rate should increase simply based on European countries increasing their military spending, making 2/year a conservative base rate.

Trump will put pressure on European countries to buy from the US in both positive and negative ways: positively by continuing to European countries to increase the % they spend on defense and using tariffs as a bargaining tool to steer deals towards the US, and negatively with behavior (e.g. frequent questioning of NATO articles, singling out European countries for criticism, questioning why we maintain bases there, general anti-European populism) suggesting Europe can no longer count on the US as a military ally.

As I tried to research this question, I started losing track of all the countries that have just implemented a tax or ETS, or are about to, or are surrounded by countries that already have. While I was less confident about what has or hasn't been "announced," it seems like these programs are just becoming more and more common.  In particular it sounds like Turkey and India are about to start new mechanisms, though again I was unclear regarding what counts as "announced." 

Leaning towards unlikely due to the resolution criterion "Apply broadly and not be limited to a single country or entity." My impression is that the Trump administration is for export controls to specific countries (like China - especially if they want to use the threat of controls as leverage in ongoing trade negotiations) but against export controls that apply globally. They have expressed sympathies to tech companies that don't want their sales hindered, and generally express antipathy toward any type of regulations. The suggestion that they will replace the not-quite-rescinded the AI Diffusion Rule with something else reminds me of the similar many-years-old promise to replace the ACA with 'something better'.

While the RSF initially took Khartoum quickly, that was sort of a surprise. The RSF took several smaller villages in 2-3 days each but that isn't the same as a large city. Two other events might make for a rough base rate: it took the RSF 18 months to take el-Fasher, and it took the SAF about 23 months to retake Khartoum. Given that the RSF is (probably?) weakened from their extended siege of el-Fasher, and that the SAF is likely as entrenched as they're capable of in Khartoum, I'd say it's very unlikely for the RSF to take Khartoum back in less than 5 months, especially since they haven't even started yet.

The humanitarian crisis in Sudan is getting much worse and the world is slowly becoming aware of it. This may generate international pressure on the UAE to stop supporting the RSF. My understanding of the UAE's relationship with Sudan is that their interests are purely commercial, and they publicly deny supporting the RSF, both of which suggest it may not take immense pressure to convince the UAE to wash its hands of the mess.