DKC

It may drop a bit because as @Rene and @alter_hugo mentioned, the Middle East Escalation is at the top of the news cycle every night and may distract from Russia's invasion. But I don't expect it to plummet to pre-invasion times.

And I could not find which months they collect this data. I think (perhaps a bit ethnocentrically) that the US presidential race could impact the world's view (and particularly NATO countries) and how they would respond to these questions. I, and I assume others, believe this situation would look very different if Trump is elected rather than Harris. If this data was collected immediately after the Trump-Biden debate I think the concern could be higher than 2023 and possibly 2024. With that unknown of when it was collected I am erring on the higher side.

Okay, I'll move up a few points based on the US pushing for it. Maybe the war will unstick the logjam.

https://www.axios.com/2024/10/04/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-new-leader-us

But I'm not confident they will be able to make it happen. so not moving higher for now.

Affirming at less than .05 for each city. Based on:

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024

FTA:

The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces.

Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue intensified offensive efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine will likely culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have previously assessed.

Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not demonstrated a capacity to seize operationally significant objectives.

Perhaps motivation for Madura not to attack? It's one thing to be on the outs with the US, but when BRICs snubs you...

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-26/maduro-s-brics-invite-slips-away-as-bloc-plans-another-expansion?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

FTA:

Maduro has chased a BRICS invite as the group plans another expansion after adding four members to its core roster of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in January, in hopes of using it to bolster Venezuela’s legitimacy globally.

Russia, which will host the bloc’s annual summit next month, presented a preliminary list of names to its fellow members during the UN General Assembly in New York as it seeks consensus around which countries to invite, according to the officials, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

A Russian official close to the Kremlin declined to comment specifically on Venezuela but said Vladimir Putin’s government cannot formally invite any nation to the group before there is agreement among all current members. Neither Russia’s foreign ministry nor a spokesperson for Putin responded to comment requests.

I still think they will deploy to Togo, but with no new revelations in the news, I'm uncomfortable being so far above the crowd. Lowering on Togo

Affirming at less than .05.

The Houthis continue to be more interested in war than peace.

https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-rebels-red-sea-attacks-israel-hamas-war-2faa48176d4f773003b6a4a3ad5ca73d

Moving down a few points because as someone noted, maybe the easy countries to takeover have already happened.

Though @belikewater suggest Libya,.

And I think Cameroon may be a candidate.

https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-opposition-civil-society-deny-polls-postponement-say-its-ploy-to-extend-long-serving-presidents-role/7691550.html

Yet @ctsats made a good argument that the resolution criteria could be tricky. A civil war (which what I think is happening in Libya)  and laws that infringe Democracy (maybe what is happening in Cameroon) don't count.

So I'm dropping a few points. But not lower, because I think the infringing on Democracy in Cameroon could lead to coup, IMHO.