54th
Accuracy Rank

belikewater

About:
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-0.01689

Relative Brier Score

266

Forecasts

73

Upvotes
Forecasting Activity
Forecasting Calendar
 

Past Week Past Month Past Year This Season All Time
Forecasts 11 27 301 266 1371
Comments 13 24 306 268 506
Questions Forecasted 10 20 62 49 145
Upvotes on Comments By This User 2 4 90 73 575
 Definitions
New Prediction
belikewater
made their 11th forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
0% (0%)
1 January 2025 - 31 March 2025
0% (0%)
1 April 2025 - 30 June 2025
0% (0%)
1 July 2025 - 30 September 2025
0% (-2%)
1 October 2025 - 31 December 2025
100% (+2%)
Not before 2026
Why do you think you're right?

The parties are still too far apart. I think there's a <0.5% chance.

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Why might you be wrong?

It would take a really big change on one side or the other.

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New Prediction
belikewater
made their 7th forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
30% (0%)
Less than 30 days
12% (0%)
30 days
12% (0%)
31-60 days
12% (0%)
61-90 days
34% (0%)
91 days or more
Confirmed previous forecast
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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

I'm increasing my forecast very slightly because there are indications that the RSF may open an eastern front, around its southeastern border with Ethiopia, roughly from Yabus to Ad Damazin, in addition to its western front to the southwest of Khartoum.

Military cargo flights from the UAE to Ethiopia have apparently ramped up a lot in the past couple months, and one analyst speculates that this is to supply RSF rebels (see the whole thread on X). There have also been flights that likely brought senior defense officials and military leaders.

However, even if the RSF develops huge momentum, the timeframe for this question is very short.

While the SAF have many friends, including Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, the RSF still could gain the upper hand, with a lot of help from the UAE, a little help from South Sudan, and a small welcome mat from Ethiopia.

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Why might you be wrong?

Things could potentially happen unexpectedly quickly.

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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

I'm decreasing my forecast (a little late) because there's almost no time left.

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Why might you be wrong?

It's not impossible.

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New Prediction
Confirmed previous forecast
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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

I initially thought an agreement involving Syria could be likely, but one seems less likely at the moment. But lots of other options are always possible. For example, it should not be forgotten that Tunisia and Algeria signed a military cooperation agreement in October, and it's not inconceivable that another party could join that agreement. It wouldn't be Morocco, obviously, but a month ago, Tunisia's PM said that Libya and Tunisia share national security interests. And the UAE is already involved with many countries in the region. Still, it is hard to picture trilateral or larger arrangements in the time frame of this question (6+ months), as they tend to involve so many negotiations, and I haven't seen public declarations that any such negotiations are in the works.

One thing I wonder about is the Bab al-Mandeb area. A separatist group backed by the UAE has taken over a lot of Yemen, including Mayun Island in the Bab al-Mandeb. I wonder whether they might be considered or this question, and whether they might seek some security arrangement with Djibouti. The Yemeni rebel group now also reportedly control the island of Socotra, near Somalia. As Djibouti has security arrangements with Somalia, an arrangement involving Djibouti, Somalia, the Yemeni separatists, and the UAE might be reasonable. I don't know the stance of the Yemeni group with respect to their African neighbors, though, and the separatist group might not be considered a "country" for the purposes of this question.

Egypt also signed a security agreement with Oman in July. And other arrangements are in place or in various stages of discussion.

There are a lot of public bilateral arrangements, and probably a lot of secret arrangements. I don't think it would be that implausible to add an additional partner to such an arrangement or to start a new one, but I don't think that's most likely to happen in the time frame of this question.

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Why might you be wrong?

Bilateral negotiations take a lot less time than negotiations among more parties, but some things might already be in the works. 

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New Prediction
belikewater
made their 21st forecast (view all):
This forecast will expire on Jan 9, 2026
Probability
Answer
Forecast Window
2% (-48%)
Yes
Dec 9, 2025 to Jun 9, 2026
98% (+48%)
No
Dec 9, 2025 to Jun 9, 2026
Why do you think you're right?

My forecast has been too high on this question. With Israel continuing attacks in Gaza, I think the situation is still too raw for countries to join the accords.

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Why might you be wrong?

Things can change quickly.

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New Prediction
belikewater
made their 8th forecast (view all):
Probability
Answer
0% (0%)
Less than 62%
0% (0%)
More than or equal to 62% but less than 66%
1% (-2%)
More than or equal to 66% but less than 70%
99% (+2%)
More than or equal to 70% but less than 74%
0% (0%)
More than or equal to 74%
Why do you think you're right?

>=70% looks very clear at this point.

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Why might you be wrong?

A lower value is not completely impossible but almost at this point.

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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

I do think they're headed to Togo soon, following recent meetings between officials from Togo and Russian officials in Moscow, but the forecast period is almost over.

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Why might you be wrong?

It could still happen. 

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New Prediction
Why do you think you're right?

The RSF just just took control of the Heglig oilfield in South Kordofan province. Reuters reports that, "Heglig, which lies along Sudan's southern border, houses the main processing facility for South Sudanese oil, which makes up much of the revenue for South Sudan's government. ... Oil is transported through the Greater Nile pipeline system to Port Sudan on the Red Sea for export, making the Heglig site vital both for Sudan's hard-currency earnings and for South Sudan, which is landlocked and relies almost entirely on pipelines through Sudan. The war that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese army and the RSF has repeatedly disrupted South Sudan's oil flows, which before the conflict averaged between 100,000 and 150,000 barrels per day for export via Sudan."

The RSF will likely leverage this control with South Sudan to make deals for arms and supplies to flow through South Sudan. Any such deals could potentially reduce their dependency on the UAE, but it's more likely that the UAE will help them to market the oil.

The RSF also just conducted an attack in Kalogi, which is near El Obeid and is getting closer to Khartoum. And while there's a lot of distance between Kalogi and Khartoum, a lot of it is open space. While it wouldn't be easy to take all of this territory, it's likely easier than trying to take some densely populated area.

The time frame remains very tight, though, and the resolution criteria for this question are very strict.

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Why might you be wrong?

The time frame of this forecast remains tight, but the RSF is moving. And I don't rule out that the RSF could move through to take Khartoum quickly, although it seems very unlikely.

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