0.399154
Relative Brier Score
26
Forecasts
0
Upvotes
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Forecasts | 0 | 0 | 13 | 11 | 26 |
| Comments | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 7 |
| Questions Forecasted | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 6 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Definitions | |||||
Most Active Topics:
Geopolitical Security,
Russia-Ukraine War,
Artificial Intelligence,
Emerging Technology,
Iran: Threats & Influence
Most Active Topics:
Iran-VNSAs,
Cybersecurity
Why do you think you're right?
PRC direct military action against Taiwan remains unlikely in the near term due to lack of conditions set with military capability, on-island influence, and other geopolitical constraints including unpredictability of US actions.
Why might you be wrong?
Physical reality that limits counter-intervention strategies combined with internal pressures within PRC could shift calculus to seizing an opportunity before US and Allies develop greater capability to deter or counter such activities.
Why do you think you're right?
RU cyber activity with varying levels of attribution has been ongoing for years in many countries, and unpredictability of knock-on effects from a cyber attack could result in unintended physical or kinetic results.
Why might you be wrong?
Ongoing US brokered negotiations may de-escalate attributable RU actions that could be deemed to undermine them.
Why do you think you're right?
Ongoing negotiations with key stakeholders on both sides of the war are pressing for a ceasefire. While a ceasefire may not hold, it is likely that both sides see advantage in pursuing one on terms they appear may be in their long term interest.
Why might you be wrong?
Tensions between belligerents, volatility of the conflict at the tactical edge, and complex geopolitical dynamics among external parties could delay or disrupt ceasefire negotiations.
Why do you think you're right?
US has long held-across administrations-the policy position that Iran cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. Strikes by Israel have likely increased Iran incentives for nuclear weapons breakout while not fully destroying their capability to do so. Combined with the potential for Iranian proxies to conduct attacks against US interests in the ME, with or without Iranian regime direction, increases the likelihood that US will determine that strikes against remaining nuclear facilities is necessary and there is a window of opportunity with their current C2 and A2/AD degraded.
Why might you be wrong?
Iranian civilian leadership may determine regime survival is contingent upon guarantees-at least in the near term-of working towards nuclear disarmament. Such concessions or notable progress in negotiations could prevent or at least forestall US direct involvement in the conflict. Additionally, political pressures are divided and the decision almost certainly rests with POTUS who has a longstanding reluctance to commit US forces to a costly ME conflict (despite a willingness to conduct military operations of limited scale and scope when deemed to be advantageous and at manageable cost and risk).