In the past 20 years, North Korea has had 6 nuclear tests. Splitting that into 6 month increments gives a base rate of 15% (6 tests in 40 six-month periods). I agree with the crowd that things are relatively more calm now and North Korea might not want draw attention to itself, but I do expect that at some point they'll want another test and I don't want to deviate too far from the base rate.
-0.921876
Relative Brier Score
922
Forecasts
189
Upvotes
Forecasting Calendar
| Past Week | Past Month | Past Year | This Season | All Time | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Comments | 4 | 12 | 152 | 147 | 321 |
| Questions Forecasted | 6 | 15 | 49 | 39 | 129 |
| Upvotes on Comments By This User | 2 | 5 | 44 | 41 | 189 |
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Star Commenter - Nov 2025
Why do you think you're right?
Why might you be wrong?
I've lowered quite a bit from the base rate due to the fact that there are no signs of imminent testing (e.g. no obvious preparations). The crowd is probably right that there should be a downward adjustment, but I'm nervous to be so far away from the base rate.
Why do you think you're right?
I thought this analysis by the Swift Centre was informative, and I'll remain at 1% as I don't think serious action is likely before 2027. I don't think China will launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan in the next six months, but I think a "test blockade" (while also unlikely) is possible. While I think a short blockade is not a good overall strategic move for China, it could provide information on how the US and Taiwan would react. There is also a fair bit of time within this forecast window between winter storms and monsoon season, so I'm comfortable leaving 1%.
Why might you be wrong?
I mentioned a test blockade in my rationale, but there are other unexpected ways this might resolve. Maybe China is further ahead than I thought, maybe some other technicality could trigger a resolution. A blockade doesn't need to be successful to count, so maybe China could potentially just divert some ship traffic to raise costs for Taiwan.
Why do you think you're right?
It seems like even if there is a ceasefire, coalition troop commitments would not be part of it, but, instead, security guarantees seem more likely. Even still, a peace deal seems unlikely to be agreed upon by the end of the year and even if coalition troops were part of it, even if it happened tomorrow, it would probably take longer than the end of the year to have them deployed.
Why might you be wrong?
The way I could imagine being wrong is if the negotiations completely fall apart and if something unexpected happens like Russia launching a major offensive AND maybe countries like Poland and maybe one or two others send in supporting forces. It all seems very unlikely.
Why do you think you're right?
My gut tells me that recent talks of a peace framework will probably fall apart when the fine points are discussed, but it seems like Russia and Ukraine have been getting closer and closer, so I think there is a real chance. I would be at 8%, but there's a lot I don't know, so I'll add a few percentage points to the penultimate bin.
Why might you be wrong?
It seems like the premature announcement of a deal made a lot of people angry. As I mentioned in my forecast rationale, I'm a bit more pessimistic than my forecast implies, but I'm leaving some room as there may be things about this I'm not aware of.
Fellow forecaster, I think that either way, Zelenzsky is in big trouble. Let's see what happens this weekend.
Greetings.
Why do you think you're right?
This doesn't seem like a priority right now. I expect the focus to be on Russia / Ukraine for most of the rest of the year. I also think most people can't tell how much smarter / better models are getting and so the salience of this is dropping and will probably continue to fall until some other obvious capability is unlocked.
Why might you be wrong?
There are people who are very interested in seeing this happen, but even still getting to an agreement about what to do seems like it would be a lot of work without much time to do it.
Why do you think you're right?
Lowering to 7% after a few days of negotiations and after listening to Rubio's comments. It sounds like they're not there yet, but I think the US is doing what it can to apply pressure.
Why might you be wrong?