michal_dubrawski

Good comment by @TBall here. I also like the opening paragraphs of the Foreign Affairs article which TBall shared there:

"For years, Iran watchers have been spreading rumors about the demise of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. When the Islamic Republic’s Assembly of Experts pushed back a major 2024 meeting from September to November, some theorized that Khamenei was ailing. When Khamenei spent time at that meeting detailing how to choose his successor, others asserted that his end was near. And whenever Khamenei disappears for too long, people speculate that the supreme leader has already died.

Right now, rumors of Khamenei’s demise are greatly exaggerated. He is still working, and his comments about succession merely restated Iran’s constitutional provisions. But from an actuarial perspective, Khamenei’s reign is almost certainly in its final years. The supreme leader is an 85-year-old cancer survivor. In 2022, when he visited the Imam Reza shrine in 2022, a Shiite holy site in the Iranian city of Mashhad, he told those traveling with him that it would probably be his last such trip. In the not-too-distant future, the Assembly of Experts will have to anoint a new supreme leader."

First paragraph reminds me of my comment about "All the deaths of Ali Khamenei" 

Interesting articles about relatively recent developments:

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/05/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html

"President Trump on Wednesday vowed to negotiate a “verified nuclear peace agreement” with Iran, saying he wants to avoid a military clash by reaching a deal that prevents Tehran from acquiring an atomic weapon.

Mr. Trump, who withdrew from the 2015 nuclear accord that Iran negotiated with the Obama administration, effectively called for a do-over on Wednesday. In an early morning post on his social media site, the president said the United States and Iran “should start working on it immediately, and have a big Middle East Celebration when it is signed and completed.”

“I want Iran to be a great and successful Country, but one that cannot have a Nuclear Weapon,” Mr. Trump wrote.

The diplomatic entreaty by the president came just hours after he announced a very different strategy toward Iran: a return to the “maximum pressure” campaign that he employed during his first term to threaten the country’s religious leadership with vast economic sanctions and other measures designed to isolate the regime."

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250207-iran-s-khamenei-warns-against-negotiating-with-us

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-cites-need-further-develop-irans-military-after-trump-threats-2025-02-12/

https://www.iranintl.com/en/202502239221

I reduce a bit with the passage of time. Still, I remember that all it takes is an announcement about any collaboration, but it appears that something like that was not ever announced since O-RAN exists.

Looks like Trump still wants to push with O-RAN which was to be expected:

https://www.lightreading.com/open-ran/trump-still-cares-about-open-ran

President Trump name-checked open RAN technology during his recent meeting with Japan's Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru.
"The two leaders shared views on the severe and complex security environment and expressed their determination to continuously cooperate to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific," according to a White House statement on the meeting, which covered a wide range of topics. "Through these relationships, the United States, Japan and like-minded partners can deliver high quality infrastructure investments in the region, including the deployment of Open Radio Access Networks in third countries."
Those "third" countries include the likes of Australia, India, South Korea and the Philippines.
Not surprisingly, the Open RAN Policy Coalition cheered the news. "This commitment by the US and Japan signals that open RAN is a global priority and underscores the significance of open RAN to the Trump administration," said Diane Rinaldo, executive director of the Open RAN Policy Coalition, in a statement.
Broadly, the development appears to indicate that open RAN won't be ignored during Trump's second term. That's important considering Trump during his first term helped to spearhead a political embrace of open RAN technology globally as a brace against the rise of Chinese equipment suppliers like Huawei and ZTE.
However, it's not clear whether US and Japanese support for open RAN will do much for the technology's financial prospects. After all, open RAN revenues fell by as much as 50% from 2022 to 2024, according to research firm Dell'Oro Group.

Interesting speculation from FT about Trump administration reviving the idea of US government buying or helping some US company buy Nokia or Ericsson or both: https://www.ft.com/content/2834381f-7a21-4c51-b45f-b4b9dd38c818

"Telecoms equipment manufacturing is one of the very few areas of technology where the US is not just behind but not present at all. Reliable networks are vital for business and consumers alike, as well as becoming increasingly essential in warfare, as Ukraine is demonstrating with its drone warfare.

“They have not solved that issue in the US,” says Anna Wieslander, Northern Europe director at US think-tank the Atlantic Council.

Nokia and Ericsson have an effective duopoly in much of the western world thanks to American pressure on allies not to use Huawei, their main rival, which has close ties to the Chinese state. But they have struggled to draw as much benefit out of that as many might have expected, with both experiencing disappointing profitability in recent years."

 At the moment, with the current climate in international politics, and tensions over tech rivalry also related to AI which affects Huawei (recent relevant article here), I feel as if we were asking "Will Huawei announce any cooperation with anti-Huawei Alliance in the next 7 months?" 😉

A complicated question (about pandemic, panzootic, or epiphytotic events in a single question + lengthy resolution criteria) about matters related to complex systems with a long-time horizon - we should not be too certain with our answer about the future world almost 5 years away from today. So many changes may happen between today and 1 January 2030. If ourselves from 28.02.2020 (early days of the COVID-19 pandemic - before the formal declaration of Pandemic by WHO which happened on March 11, 2020 - see this timeline) would be transported in time to today, would we be able to easily comprehend and understand today's world?

I agree with forecasters who suggest that we may be intuitively focusing too much on pandemic event part of that question while  panzootic and especially epiphytotic part may be more likely source of resolution event. I am afraid that the panzootic and especially epiphytotic announcements may be less strait forward, as we are already using bioengineering to create a genetic disease in mosquitos (for example see here), but it would be a big surprise to see the announcement about this as a disease as we are doing this to prevent the spread of diseases transferred by mosquitos among humans.

For this question to resolve as "yes" we would need 1) a biological event of high consequence (pandemic, panzootic, or epiphytotic) to happen 2) be observed and announced by the right organizations 3) be successfully attributed to human bioengineering activities.

Regarding 1) and 2) as my friend @404_NOT_FOUND wrote here: "“A new plant disease outbreak is announced” seems to set the resolution bar dramatically lower for plants than for humans and animals. I’m also quite confident that there is a lot of bioengineering already happening with plants, so the probability of an Epiphytotic event might dwarf the chances of a pandemic or panzootic one." It would be ideal to have the base rate for all three types of events, at the moment, the last one is especially hard for me to grasp in terms of how often something like that occurs.

Regarding 3) - many forecasters have expressed that in case of such an event companies and states will likely try to hide their involvement and that it was a result of their bioengineering activities.

What other facts and forces reduce the probability of such an event?
1. Post-COVID legislative actions, executive measures and agency-specific funding suspensions to reduce public funding and risk from Gain-of-Function research on dangerous pathogens (from the other hand underfunded labs will likely have problems with security unless it is very well controlled and enforced)
2. Post-COVID initiatives to improve labs security.
3. Higher general awareness of the risks associated with bioengineering and potential lab leaks.
4. as @404_NOT_FOUND mentioned here: "First and foremost, the use of a pandemic-capable pathogen as a biological weapon by state or non-state actors is, to me, the least likely scenario of all. To be effective, a weapon needs to produce predictable effects and provide a tactical advantage, which are not characteristics typical of pandemic-capable viruses. The risk for uncontrollable self-harm is simply too high, even in the case of pathogens aimed at animals or plants. Whichever field advantage one wants to gain, there are much better and cheaper options than developing and deploying bioengineered weapons. Even a terrorist non-state organization wouldn’t benefit much from generating that kind of global damage. There are plenty of historical cases of terrorist attacks that managed to resonate globally despite being relatively low-cost and much easier to realize. Think of 9/11.

If I were to think about which actor is most likely to try and develop such a bioengineered weapon, I’d guess a “lone wolf” terrorist. Incidentally, this type of individual is also less likely to have access to the necessary knowledge, equipment, and materials, and therefore he would almost inevitably fail." I agree that intentional use as a bioweapon against humans would fit the most a lone wolf terrorist or maybe an apocalyptic cult movement like Aum Shinrikyo or maybe some extreme ecological terrorist ("remove humans to save the Earth" - Tom Clancy wrote about such group in his 1998 "Rainbow Six" novel). Still, most actors, and those with specialized knowledge may not want to use bioweapon intentionally. 

What facts and forces increase the probability of such an event?
1. Weaponization of viruses like bird flu may in fact be easier than it appears - here is my favorite excerpt from Clarke's and Eddy's "Warnings" book: ""Flu is by nature highly contagious, but it also circulates best when it is not highly lethal. Killing the host too quickly prevents maximal spread of the virus. Taubenberger fears a flu endemic to one animal could make the leap, the “epizootic shift,” and become transmissible among humans. Such a virus could be less lethal in its host animals (who survive to keep spreading the virus), but be highly lethal to humans. A version of H5N1, the bird flu, can infect humans and kills with breathtaking lethality, over 60 percent dead. The good news is that H5N1 is not yet transmissible from human to human. Could this deadly flu gain the ability to spread itself from person to person? In 2011, Ron Fouchier, from the Erasmus Medical Center in downtown Rotterdam, crafted a series of experiments to mutate highly lethal H5N1 into a form contagious by air. Just five single mutations allowed H5N1 to bind with cells in the human respiratory tract (thereby making it contagious by air, sneezes, and dirty doorknobs, etc.). Using ferrets as incubators, and their noses as makeshift Petri dishes, Fouchier rapidly moved infected sputum from ferret to ferret. In a period of weeks, he created a bug as transmissible as the Spanish flu but potentially up to twenty times more lethal. Such a bug could lead to an extinction-level event for the human race. Fouchier was roundly criticized for launching such a dangerous study in a working hospital, in a crowded city, with arguably less than perfect protections. He did it without complicated tools, available in nearly any laboratory and to consumers. And he decided to publish his results to give the world a step-by-step manual, steps that could be taken in nearly any lab to make his superbug. The U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity tried to block Fouchier from publishing key aspects of his research.3 The Dutch government ruled that Fouchier could not publish this information because that amounted to the export of deadly weapons, requiring a special export license. Fouchier agrees that the results of his experiment are “very bad news,” but he hopes that, by making his research public, scientists can study and remain one step ahead of mutations that could create pandemic airborne viruses. Publish and perish?""
2. Growing number of BSL4 Labs as reported by @o-maverick here.
3. BSL4 Labs and other labs are not as safe as I once thought (that was quite a realization for me, I was a victim of what an author of "How to Tell the Liars from the Statiscians" book described as "The Fiction Problem" (see here, slide 8 - in my case these false picture came from movies and books) and my own assumptions like that if something is that dangerous, surely the government keeps it really safe). I am glad that David Manheim and other friends from the forecasting community have made me update my beliefs. David even shared with me his paper on this topic "High-risk human-caused pathogen exposure events from 1975-2016".
4. Some Future AI models may lack safeguards and be able to help non-state actors gaining the knowledge required for weaponization of pathogens (see for example here).

I agree with @mjehlenbach here, that if the test has not happened before the US presidential election it makes it less likely now, especially that Trump signals his intentions to have relations with North Korea and negotiate, even if his announced goal of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula seem very unrealistic. Ukrainian experience showed the world that it is unwise to give up your nuclear weapons, even if powerful countries give you promises for doing that. I wondered what could be a realistic success criterion for Trump in the future negotiations. During his previous administration he was able to say that his negotiations with Kim allowed the world to avoid the war and that he at least was able to deescalate the situation. Currently, Kim would have to first escalate the situation again for the same effect to be achieved - that could be a reason for a nuclear test, as this would affect public opinion around the world more than just some another ICBM test. At the same time as mjehlenbach wrote:
"Performing a seventh nuclear test will likely aggravate China, and Pyongyang will likely need to improve, not deteriorate, their relations with Beijing once the Russia-Ukraine war ends and their friendship with Russia diminishes."
I think the fact that the test did not occur before the US election makes it somewhat likely that there were a back-channel talks and pressure on North Korea not to do it - likely from China, but maybe also the US and maybe even Russia. It is also possible that nuclear weapons are to0 precious for North Korea to be used in test that could be unnecessary from the perspective of their nuclear research program. After all, they declared their nuclear program as Completed in 2017, and  maybe if they in fact tested thermonuclear device they may not need further testing for reasons other than seeking international attention and escalating for negotiations to occur?   https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/north-korea-nuclear/547019/
The history of the test site is interesting, as this Reuters article describes it:

"Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site is in a mountainous region in the far northeast of the country, about 100 km (62 miles) from the border with China.

North Korea has conducted all six of its nuclear tests at the site, in 2006, 2009, 2013, January 2016, September 2016 and September 2017. Analysts doubted North Korea's claim that the January 2016 blast was its first thermonuclear bomb, but believe that such a weapon was likely tested in 2017 in an explosion much larger than previous tests.

All the tests have been conducted in tunnels dug deep under the mountains. There are three visible entrances known as the South Portal, East Portal, and West Portal.

The entrances to those tunnels were blown up in front of a small group of foreign media invited to view the demolition when North Korea closed the site in 2018, declaring a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapons tests.

Kim has since said he no longer feels bound by the moratorium, with denuclearisation talks stalled since 2019.

In 2022 satellite imagery showed North Korea working to restore some of the tunnels, raising the prospect of new tests."

I still expect that even without initial escalation by conducting the test there could be some achievable success criterion for both Trump and Kim negotiations, but it is hard to say if they would be willing to accept the conditions of other side. Last time their negotiation have not produced such results (concessions, agreement for not conducting ICBM tests and nuclear tests etc. in return for lifting some sanctions for example).

I still think that something like the regular invasion described by the question team here it is very unlikely in two years' time. However, I am more uncertain about the European security than I was a month ago. I am afraid that Trump may start playing with European security as a pressure tool, a negotiating tactic for getting something that he wants at the moment, for his short-term gains, not caring much for the big picture and long-term NATO interests. He seems to be someone who won't have any problem with articulating his demands toward the US allies in a "do what I want, or else" manner. Also, as @michalbod described here, I think that with his recent actions Trump has made the US less trustworthy to their allies.  

Again, I keep my forecast at 1% for each.

This good article "Game Plan: After Ukraine" shared by @johnnycaffeine here pointed me to another interesting article "Mapping Russia’s War Machine on NATO’s Doorstep". The article is long, but the most interesting and relevant parts for me are these:

Recently retired top commanders in Estonia’s Defense Forces—Martin Herem, Veiko-Vello Palm, and Jüri Saska—agree that the full-scale annexation of the Baltic states is unlikely. “I don’t think Russia will attack Estonia tomorrow,” retired General Ben Hodges told Delfi, adding, “at least not in the traditional sense.” Nevertheless, he considers the Russian threat against Estonia and the other Baltic states to be very real, not hypothetical. 

Konrad Muzyka, too, remains confident in NATO’s security. He notes that nearly all Russian military production is consumed by the war in Ukraine, and most of the ground forces from Kaliningrad are already on the front lines. “As long as the U.S. is part of NATO and not preoccupied in Asia, we’re secure—even if Ukraine falls and Russia takes half of it. Russia will emerge from this war significantly weakened, especially its ground forces.”
More concerning scenarios would see the U.S. occupied by conflict in the Pacific. Muzyka notes that, under NATO’s defense doctrine, air superiority would be key in conflict. “We’ll neutralize Russian air defenses and won’t need massive artillery; our aircraft are precise enough to destroy enemy ground forces,” Muzyka says.
But what if U.S. air forces are engaged elsewhere, like in a military conflict between China and Taiwan? Muzyka concludes: “In that case, we’d be in a very difficult position.”

General Ben Hodges has no doubts, “The Russians are already clearly at war with us, even if we don’t recognize it,” he says, citing examples like the severing of undersea cables, acts of sabotage across Europe, airspace violations, cyberattacks and hacking. Russia uses such operations to test the West’s reactions. “And each time we fail to respond when a Russian missile or drone crosses Polish or Romanian airspace, it emboldens them,” Hodges explains.